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Strategic Risk Management and Corporate Value Creation   
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
Major corporate failures, periodic recessions, regional debt crises and volatile markets have intensified 
the focus on corporate risk management as the means to deal better with turbulent business conditions. 
Hence, the ability to respond effectively to the often dramatic environmental changes is considered an 
important source of competitive advantage. However, surprisingly little research has analyzed if the 
presumed advantages of effective risk management lead to superior performance or assessed important 
antecedents of effective risk management capabilities. Here we present a comprehensive study of risk 
management effectiveness and the relationship to corporate performance based on panel data for more 
than 3,400 firms accounting for over 33,500 annual observations during the turbulent period 1991-
2010. Determining effective risk management as the ability to reduce earnings and cash flow volatility, 
we find that it has significant positive relationships to lagged performance measures after controlling 
for industry effects and company size. We also find that availability of slack resources and investment 
commitments affect the risk management capabilities and their relationship to performance.   
 
__________________ 
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Strategic risk management has become a mantra in executive board rooms following the 
corporate scandals and financial crises of recent years. There is general awareness that the ability to 
deal effectively with major risk events is an important aspect of strategic management (e.g., Miller, 
1998; Wang, Barney & Reuer, 2003). However, we are not sure whether the adopted risk management 
practices truly lead to the implied superior outcomes and, if so, what the essential drivers of effective 
risk handling are (e.g., Beasly, Pagach & Warr, 2008; Liebenberg & Hoyt, 2003; Pagach & Warr, 
2011). In reality, there is limited evidence on the proposed benefits from effective risk management 
capabilities and it is unclear what the implications are for governance, management practice and 
strategy conduct in general (Power, 2009; Smithson & Simkins, 2005). So, while risk management has 
assumed a central executive focus little is known about the strategic effects and how potential effects 
may be derived. 
The ability to adapt to changing conditions is considered beneficial for organizations and has a 
long tradition in social science (e.g., Levinthal & March, 1981; March, 1988). Strategic response 
capabilities allow firms to adjust to abrupt environmental changes and strategic renewal facilitates 
organizational adaptation (Agarwal & Helfat, 2009; Bettis & Hitt, 1995). The dynamic capabilities 
construct suggests that observant and innovative organizations respond better to changing conditions 
(Teece, Pisano & Shuen, 1997; Teece, 2007) where knowledge exploration identifies opportunities that 
can adapt the way the firm operates (Damodaran, 2008). That is, maintaining sufficient slack for 
investing in opportunities can enhance responsiveness and thus support effective risk management 
(Andersen, 2009). However, these rationales are fairly unexplored and represent a promising area for 
empirical studies. To this end, we investigate the performance outcomes of effective risk management 
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and its antecedents drawing on panel data from more than 3,400 firms with over 33,500 data points 
during the turbulent period 1991-2010.  
In the following we first review literature streams related to strategic risk management and 
provide an overview of the few empirical studies conducted to date. Then we develop a model of risk 
management effectiveness linked to investment intensity and available slack and conduct a number of 
preliminary empirical tests. We find initial support for positive value creation effects from effective 
risk management capabilities and indications that these effects are associated with availability of slack 
resources and investment in opportunities. These findings are presented and implications for future 
research enhancements are discussed.  
 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
Risk management and strategic responsiveness   
One argument for risk management is that lower cash flow volatility reduces the likelihood of liquidity 
shortfalls so funds are more readily available for good investments (Froot, Sharfstein & Stein, 1993; 
Myers, 1977; Nocco & Stultz, 2006). The associated earnings stability reduces bankruptcy risk and 
provides access to external funding at more favorable rates (e.g., Minton & Schrand, 1999; Smithson & 
Simkin, 2005). Hence, effective risk management can help the firm “maintain access to the capital 
markets and other resources necessary to implement its strategy and business plans” (Nocco & Stultz, 
2006). Lower cash flow volatility reduces the need for liquidity buffers and a lower level of cash 
reserves will release funds for alternative business investment with higher returns (Merton, 2005). That 
is, incremental value can accrue from the ability to finance more profitable projects and at lower 
funding cost. The lower bankruptcy risk can also reduce the transaction costs associated with the firm’s 
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interactions with essential stakeholders that offer less than favorable business conditions in their 
dealings with vulnerable counterparts (e.g., Miller & Chen, 2003; Wang, Barney & Reuer, 2003).  
This reasoning is consistent with the valuation principles where the value of the firm (VOF) is 
determined as the present value of future cash generation (C) minus bankruptcy costs as reflected in 
transaction and funding charges: VOF = PV[C – bankruptcy costs] (e.g., Stulz, 2003, p. 57). So, value 
from effective risk management can derive either from a reduction in the bankruptcy costs or through 
an increase in future cash flows from profitable projects or from both of these sources. In addition to 
this, we argue that there is an incremental value creating potential associated with the ability to develop 
innovative opportunities that can be implemented if and when abrupt changes in the competitive 
environment call for it. The availability of these optional responses improves the strategic 
maneuverability of the firm and the execution of the new business initiatives will enhance future cash 
flow generation that creates corporate value. 
The resulting capacity to adapt the organization and pursue strategic renewal should enable the 
firm to modify the way things are done in response to major changes in the environment so it can 
maintain a reasonable fit with current customer needs and operational practices. Strategic reference 
point theory and considerations about strategic fit suggest that there is potential value associated with 
the firm’s ability to better match the requirements imposed by the strategic context at any given time 
(Fiegenbaum, Hart & Schendel, 1996; Porter, 1996). If the firm is able to fulfill changing customer 
needs then total revenues should remain high and if the firm is able to implement state-of the-art 
operating practices then costs should remain low and as a consequence of both hence performance and 
ongoing value creation should be high. 
However, many important risk factors are exogenous to the firm and imposed by socio-
economic conditions in the macro-environment that are beyond managerial control. This may comprise 
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events that are identical under similar circumstances and allow prediction of probable outcomes as well 
as events that must be assessed without a valid basis for classification reflecting the well known 
distinction between risk and uncertainty (Knight, 1921: 224). It may also relate to factors that are 
impossible to foresee in advance sometimes referred to as ‘unknown unknowns’ (e.g., Loch et al., 
2006). Strategic risk factors including competitor moves, technology shifts, changing industry 
paradigms, etc., are hard to quantify and difficult to predict because the underlying events are irregular 
and may arise from complex non-linear conditions (Bettis & Hitt, 1995). That is, strategic risks are 
typically in the unknown end of the risk scale. Furthermore, the related risk exposures arise from the 
unique structures and market positions assumed by the individual firms. Hence, the response 
capabilities required to deal effectively with the strategic risks must also be of a firm-specific nature 
(Helfat et al., 2007; Teece et al., 1997; Zollo & Winter, 2002). The ability to develop new business 
opportunities and execute them as responsive initiatives in view of environmental changes constitutes 
one such form of firm-specific response capability.    
The ability to adapt to changing conditions has been referred to as “dynamic capabilities” 
formally described as “the firm’s ability to integrate, build, and reconfigure internal and external 
competences to address rapidly changing environments” (Teece, Pisano & Shuen, 1997). They are 
formed by distinct skills, processes and procedures embedded in the organizational structures in ways 
that enable the firm to sense change, seize opportunities and reconfigure in the face of change (Teece, 
2007). Like “strategic responsiveness” this requires an ability to assess environmental change and 
mobilize firm resources around responsive actions taken to adapt the firm to new challenges in the 
environment (Andersen, Denrell & Bettis, 2007). These response capabilities are affected by the 
decision structure, information and communication systems, coordination mechanisms, incentives and 
corporate values applied in the organization (Teece, 2007). Hence, we conceive of effective risk 
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management (ERM) capabilities as the firm’s ability to observe, react, and adapt to major risk events so 
the variation in corporate cash flows and earnings are reduced compared to industry peers.  
 
H 1:  Firms that demonstrate effective risk management capabilities are associated with higher value 
creation potentials 
 
 
Slack resources and investment intensity 
The conventional view on risk evolved from insurance and financial hedging perspectives where the 
aim is to obtain economic cover against excessive loss situations. However, variability in cash flows 
and returns implies that outcomes go both up and down over time and suggests that we must assume a 
broader view when we deal with strategic risk management to consider the potential for positive upside 
gains as well as negative downside losses (Andersen, 2012; Damodaran, 2008; Slywotzky, 2007). 
Nocco and Stultz (2006) discuss the enterprise risk management approach where top management 
prioritizes corporate risk-taking and decentralized decision makers evaluate local risk-return tradeoff. 
However, many important responsive initiatives can be taken at dispersed decision nodes where 
exogenous influences are observed first and where a certain excess of resources, or slack, may facilitate 
the underpinning innovative opportunity development.  
Slack can be conceived as the means to smooth performance against environmental shocks 
thereby avoiding disruptive layoffs so value creating capital investments in promising business 
opportunities can be retained. However, we are particularly interested in the way slack resources may 
enhance responsive initiatives and corporate adaptability in the face of exogenous risk events and the 
literature implicitly speaks to this. For example, Thompson (1967) recognizes that slack can allow the 
firm to take advantage of opportunities afforded by the environment in which it operates. Bromiley 
(1991) argues that “firms with additional resources have more strategic options available than firms 
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without resources”. The presence of slack resources arguably leads to a range of strategic options and 
alternative profit-yielding activities (Amit & Schumacker, 1993). Slack may facilitate product 
innovation and experimentation that enable endogenous corporate growth (Greve, 2003; Lawson, 2001; 
Penrose, 1959, 1995; Pitelis, 2007). Hence, there are arguments for positive relationships between slack 
and innovation (Nohria & Gulati, 1996), risk-taking (Singh, 1986), and adaptation (Kraatz & Zajac, 
2001). That is, slack resources can provide funding for initiatives with strong subunit support that 
otherwise might fail in the formal approval procedures. These activities relate to process, technology 
and product improvements rather than problem-oriented innovations typically imposed through more 
formal managerial interventions (Cyert & March, 1963).  
Hence, innovative risk taking behavior is more likely in the presence of organizational slack 
where resources can be released for experimentation without formalized controls and managerial 
scrutiny. That is, slack thrives under economic affluence and is associated with decentralized structures 
whereas poor performance may lead to tighter controls and more centralization (Bourgeois & Singh, 
1983; Singh, 1986). Organizational search may often be induced by failure to reach targeted 
performance aspirations (March & Shapira, 1987, 1992) but it “is sometimes also stimulated, largely 
unintentionally, by organizational slack, and by illusions that organizational actors have about their 
abilities to overcome risks” (March, 1995). Experimentation with new ideas, technologies, and market 
offerings “thrives on serendipity, risk-taking, novelty, free association, madness, loose discipline and 
relaxed control” (March, 1995), all conditions that may derive from the availability of slack resources. 
Innovation is fostered by individuals in the organization as they generate, discuss, promote, and realize 
new ideas (Damanpour, 1991; Scott & Bruce, 1994; Van de Ven, 1986) and slack resources induce 
experimentation, risk taking, and proactive strategic choices (Judge et al., 1997; Greve, 2003; Keegan 
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& Turner, 2002). In short, slack should induce strategic responsiveness and there is some evidence that 
slack is associated with lower downside risk (Miller & Leiblein, 1996).   
The key to dealing effectively with strategic risks that are hard to predict and foresee depends 
on the organization’s ability to sense impending changes and seize ways to respond to them (Teece, 
2007). Hence, a responsive organization is one where new suggestions about how things can be done 
differently are allowed to flourish. So, organizational adaptation is reflected in an ability to innovate 
and apply new ideas, devices, systems, policies, programs, processes, products, services, and markets 
in ways that make firm operations more compliant with current conditions (Damanpour, 1991; Nohria 
& Gulati, 1996; Scott & Bruce, 1994). Finding new ways of doing things can also be conceptualized as 
a type of experimentation where the organization explores the effects of different combinations of 
technical and organizational elements (Kogut & Kulatilaka, 2001). The innovations can relate to 
product development, use of new technologies, new market entry, etc., but may also include changes in 
organizational processes, administrative practices, management approaches, etc. (Bourgeois, 1981; 
Damanpour & Evan, 1984). These responsive behaviors can be seen to drive exploratory actions that 
make it possible for the firm to modify business activities and accommodate changes in customer 
needs, technologies, economic conditions, etc. Accordingly, the associated strategic responsiveness, or 
dynamic capabilities, are considered a fundamental source of competitive advantage (Bettis & Hitt, 
1995; Teece et al., 1997). Hence, the extent to which investment and slack resources are made available 
to drive these business opportunities and innovative initiatives can be important moderators of effective 
risk management capabilities. 
 
   H 2:  The level of slack resources positively moderates the performance effect of the firm’s effective 
risk management capabilities 
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The availability of investment and slack resources can build up in various ways, e.g., as low 
financial leverage, strong cash flow generation, extraordinary dividends, high liquidity reserves, excess 
salaries, incremental service fees, room for budgeted expenses, perks and prerequisites. Hence, slack 
can comprise excess payments to organizational members above what is required to perform current 
activities and it may comprise excess payments from customers for individual services. It may reflect 
additional financial means from internal self-generation or through access to external capital markets. It 
can also manifest itself in physical things including extra people, additional cash, more time, excess 
capacity, etc. and thereby constitutes a mechanism that can absorb fluctuations in the business 
environment (Bromiley, 2005; Cyert & March, 1963; Singh, 1986). 
Recoverable slack is made up by excessive payments for various factor inputs and excess 
operating capacity. This kind of slack can be recovered fairly easily through internal budget 
reallocations at the business unit level and constitutes a resource buffer that allows pursuit of 
development projects despite environmental disruptions (Cyert & March, 1963; Sharfman et al., 1988). 
While this kind of absorbed slack has discretionary limitations they do provide room for ongoing 
collaborative learning activities and can fund immediate initiatives with strong subunit support that 
otherwise might fail in formal approval procedures (Cyert & March, 1963; Wayne & Rubinstein, 1992; 
Keegan & Turner, 2002). Hence, these generic absorbed resources provide sufficient discretion to 
reallocate resources for local purposes to facilitate innovation, experimentation, responsive initiatives, 
and adaptive moves (Greve, 2003; Kraatz & Zajac, 2001; Lawson, 2001; Nohria & Gulati, 1996; 
Pitelis, 2007). As a consequence recoverable slack is likely to facilitate experimentation that generate 
innovation around alternative ways to conduct business that increases the organization’s ability to adapt 
to changing environmental conditions despite formalized controls. 
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Available slack constitutes unabsorbed resources that are readily available from the firm’s cash 
position comprising bank balances, marketable securities, short term receivables, etc. It is argued that 
this provides a higher level of managerial discretion and furnish financial means that otherwise might 
be hard to get approved (Cyert & March, 1963; Nohria & Gulati, 1996). However, these generic 
unabsorbed resources are monitored by the treasury function that require more formal approvals and 
leave less discretion to local entities (Voss et al., 2008). Nonetheless, this type of slack allows for 
relatively quick access to resources in support of development projects even though the release of 
financial means is expected to undergo some type of formal approval. Everything else equal, the 
availability of these additional resources should furnish more alternative business propositions and 
strategic options (Amit & Schumacker, 1993; Bromiley, 1991). This ability to generate more viable 
strategic alternatives should increase corporate maneuverability and thereby enhance the ability to 
adapt to strategic risk events caused by environmental changes. 
Potential slack constitutes the ability to access external funding, such as, bank borrowing and 
securities issues, and thus comprises part of the generic unabsorbed resources in the firm that would 
need formal approval and more extensive preparations to be released (Bourgeois & Singh, 1993; Voss 
et al., 2008). These financing sources constitute the funding reservoir discussed in much of the finance 
literature as the means to support investment in profitable business development projects (e.g., Froot et 
al. 2003; Smithson & Simkins, 2005). We can interpret this as a way to execute the firm’s strategic 
options that will require an initial investment layout to be set in motion (McGrath & Nerkar, 2001; 
O’Brien, 2003). Hence, the availability of additional capital resources from the market by maintaining 
relatively low financial leverage gives the firm more leeway to exercise strategic options, i.e., 
investment propositions, when environmental conditions suggest that it is advantageous to do so 
(Miller, 1998; Luehrman, 1998). Hence, the availability of potential slack makes it possible to execute 
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alternative business propositions once they have been developed and thereby enhance adaptability to 
changes in the environment.  
Recoverable slack provides more discretion to reallocate resources for new innovative purposes 
by reshuffling internal budget allocations at the local business unit level (Cyert & March, 1963; 
Sharfman et al., 1988; Voss et al., 2008). Hence, it can provide room to take immediate initiatives in 
response to changing conditions, experiment, and learn from these activities (Wayne & Rubinstein, 
1992; Keegan & Turner, 2002).  Available slack is made up by cash and liquid assets that can fund 
more extensive or expansive business activities. However, access to these resources is typically 
monitored by the treasurer and thus requires formal approval to be deployed (Nohria & Gulati, 1996; 
Voss et al., 2008). Potential slack represents the firm’s borrowing capacity in the bank and capital 
markets as the means to implement larger business propositions. However, access to this funding 
typically requires substantial legal documentation, sign-off by corporate executives and may even 
require formal board approval, i.e., the deployment of such resources is more time consuming and 
demanding (Bourgeois & Singh, 1993; Voss et al., 2008). In short, recoverable slack are resources 
more readily accessible for grass roots initiatives responding to current changes, whereas available and 
potential slack are the potential funding sources that can help expand these initiatives as they evolve 
into larger and more important organizational activities.  
   
  H 3:  Higher levels of recoverable, available and potential slack are positively related to the firm’s 
effective risk management capabilities 
 
  H 4:  Recoverable, available and potential slack have positive interactive effects on the firm’s 
effective risk management capabilities  
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Availability of slack can shield the firm’s operating core from exogenous changes in the 
environment but may thereby create complacency and ignorance among organizational actors that 
eliminate or reduce responsive behaviors (Bansal, 2003; Thompson, 1976; Yasai-Ardekani, 1986). So, 
slack can reduce managerial risk-taking and cause poor responsiveness, operational inefficiencies and 
sub-optimization (Palmer & Wiseman, 1999; Singh, 1986). Hence, excessive slack may induce risk 
aversion that reduces exploratory initiatives (Mishina, Pollock & Porac, 2004). Furthermore, slack may 
represent wasteful use of resources where organizational agents assume fringe benefits as they act in 
their own self-interest (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Williamson, 1964). In short, the potential risk 
management effects of slack seem to have limitations.  
 
  H 5:  The positive relationships between recoverable, available and potential slack resources and 
effective risk management capabilities are non-linear  
 
 
 In the following, we outline an empirical study devised to test the proposed hypotheses and 
present the results from the associated analyses.  
 
 
METHODOLOGY 
Data and measures  
The data for the study was extracted from Compustat over the twenty years from 1991 to 2010 
including companies across all industries but excluding firms in the regulated financial sector 
(6000<SIC<6999) and diverse conglomerates (SIC>8800). The time period was chosen because it 
covers a decade (1991-2000) of economic growth and global expansion for which a number of 
empirical studies exist followed by a decade (2001-2010) of turbulence and two economic recessions. 
Given the implied volatility of the business environment, the twenty-year period 1991-2010 is 
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considered suitable for a study of potential risk management effects. We excluded firms with total sales 
below US$50 million, which is set as the limit for small-to-medium sized firms (SMEs). Hence, the 
accessible dataset comprised 3,436 companies with an average of 7 years panel data available on key 
variables. The proposed risk management relationships expressed in hypotheses 1 and 2 were analyzed 
in multiple regressions using annual performance (PERt) as the dependent variable and effective risk 
management (ERMt-5) over the preceding five-year period and its interaction terms with slack variables 
from the current year (ERMt-5*SLACKt) as independent variables. The regressions were controlled for 
industry performance in the current period (PERindustry, t) and included a number of other control 
variables (CONTROLt) for the same year. 
 
(1)  PERt  =  α  +  β1ERMt-5  +  β2PERindustry, t  +  β3ERMt-5*SLACKt  +  β4CONTROLt 
 
The potential antecedents to risk management as expressed in hypotheses 3, 4 and 5 were 
analyzed in multiple regressions using effective risk management (ERMt-5) as the dependent variable 
and different measures of slack (SLACKt-5), interaction terms between different types of slack 
(SLACK{X}t-5*SLACK{Y}), and slack measures to the second power ({SLACKt-5}2) as independent 
variables. The regressions included other control variables (CONTROLt-5) and all variables were 
calculated across the same five-year periods. 
 
(2)  ERMt-5 = α + β1SLACKt-5 + β2SLACK{X}t-5*SLACK{Y}t-5 + β3{SLACKt-5}2 + β4CONTROLt-5 
 
Performance was measured as return on assets (ROA) for the full year calculated as the annual 
net income divided by average assets over the period determined as the simple mean of assets at the 
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beginning of the year and at yearend. Tobin’s q was included as an alternative performance measure 
and calculated as market value of equity divided by the book value of equity to indicate how the market 
values the company in relation to the replacement cost of the productive assets. The effective risk 
management (ERM) measure was determined as the coefficient of variation in corporate sales divided 
by the standard deviation in corporate performance outcomes both calculated over consecutive five-
year periods. For this purpose corporate performance was defined as earnings and cash flow returns 
measured as return on assets (ROA) and cash flow return on invested capital (CFROI) respectively. 
ROA was determined as net profit divided by total assets and CFROI was determined as net cash flows 
for the year divided by total invested capital.  
The variability in corporate sales over a given period will capture the direct influences of 
exogenous strategic risk factors, including things like economic shocks and abrupt competitor moves, 
whereas earnings and cash flow volatility reflects the firm’s ability to dampen the impact of these 
events on performance outcomes during the same period. Hence, the ratio of variation in sales divided 
by the earnings volatility has been adopted as an indicator of risk management effectiveness (Andersen, 
2008, 2009). Here, we used two measures for effective risk management (ERM), one based on the 
volatility in annual earnings development expressed as ROA and another based on cash flow volatility 
expressed as CFROI.  This is broadly consistent with measures adopted in strategic management based 
on accounting returns, such as, standard deviation on ROE, ROA, ROI, etc. (e.g., Bromiley et al., 2001; 
Miller & Reuer, 1996) and the use of the standard deviation in cash flow returns in finance inspired 
studies (e.g., Miller & Chen, 2003; Minton & Schrand, 1999). 
The risk management process implied by the ERM construct captures an organizational 
capacity to deal with all major risk events including environmental hazards, financial turmoil, 
operational disruptions, and strategic incidents like changes in competitive structure, technology shifts, 
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new regulations, etc. The variability in realized returns, e.g., ROA, indicates performance after the firm 
has responded to the exogenous risk events and thus indicates the extent to which cash and earnings 
flows have been stabilized through the influence of good risk management capabilities. Incidentally, 
the risk measure will also capture adverse effects caused by endogenous risk events within the firm, 
such as, operational disruptions, technological breakdowns, processing errors, human failures, 
administrative mistakes, fraud, etc. Since net profit, and thereby return on assets, is influenced by 
developments in total revenues and expenditures, the measure of the ERM variable indicates whether 
the firm has been able to adapt its current costs to changes in corporate sales.   
The net profit is determined as total revenues minus total costs, i.e., Profit{P} = Revenues{R} – 
Cost{C}. So, the variance in net profits is affected by variations in the revenue generation and in the 
cost development. That is, the standard deviation in profitability is affected by the standard deviation in 
revenues, the standard deviation in costs, and their inverse co-variation between the two.1 Hence, the 
more revenues and costs co-vary over time the lower will be the variation in profits and by extension 
the variation in return on assets. This means that a simple interpretation of the risk management process 
is the firm’s ability to engage in cost effective responses to dramatic changes in sales where new 
initiatives can be taken quickly without incurring excessive incremental costs as market demand 
expands and find alternative ways in a costless manner when the market contracts. This reflects 
effective strategic response capabilities under conditions of unpredictable changes in the competitive 
environment where the adaptation of internal processes that modify use of resources to accommodate 
responsive initiatives is done in cost efficient ways (Bettis & Hitt, 1995).  
                                                 
1 σP = [(ωRσR)2 + (ωCσC)2  – 2(ρR,C ωR ωC σR σC)]1/2 where σP is the standard deviation in net profit (P), σR is the standard 
deviation in total revenues (R), σC is the standard deviation in total costs (C), ρR,C is the correlation coefficient between 
revenues and costs, and ωR and ωC are the relative weights of revenues against costs. Ideally ωR > ωC  but they are often of 
almost equal size, which simplifies the equation to: σP = [σR2 + σC2  – 2ρR,C  σR σC)]1/2. 
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Effective risk management may be affected by a number of things including the ability to 
innovate and search for new business opportunities within the organization that can be driven by the 
availability of slack resources and internal cash generation. Recoverable slack is determined as total 
expenses devoted to operational activities measured as sales, general, and administrative expenses 
divided by total sales (Bourgeois & Singh, 1993; Miller & Leiblein, 1996; Reuer & Leiblein, 2000). 
This is often referred to as the firm’s SGA ratio. Available slack indicates the organization’s ability to 
meet short-term resource commitments and is measured by the current ratio equal to current assets 
divided by current liabilities (Bourgeois & Singh, 1993). We also refer to this as the firm’s liquidity 
reserves. Potential slack is captured by the debt-to-equity ratio measured as total long-term debt 
divided by shareholders’ equity consisting of paid-in capital and retained earnings. The debt-equity 
ratio has been adopted in a variety of studies as a measure of financial slack (Bromiley, 1991; 
Bourgeois & Singh, 1993). To be more exact, we use the equity-debt ratio here to measure the firm’s 
capital reserves because it is a positive indicator of the ability to obtain new funding from the external 
debt and capital markets.    
We included a number of control variables in the regressions. The performance regressions 
included industry performance measured as average performance of peers within the firm’s two-digit 
SIC code industry to control for systematic differences in industry performance. Organizational size 
reflects prior success and may provide the firm with additional leeway to cope with external shocks and 
periods of adverse conditions (Aldrich, 1999; Sharfman et al., 1988) and was measured as the natural 
logarithm of total sales to reduce effects of skewed data. Investment intensity reflects the level of 
capital expenditures assumed by the firm compared to the total assets and captures the firm’s ongoing 
investment in business opportunities. Autonomous investments measure the free cash flows available to 
firm compared to total capital expenditures and thus reflects a certain leeway to make ongoing 
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investment in responsive initiatives (Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz & Williamson, 1999; Minton & Schrand, 
1999). Finally, all the measures of performance, effective risk management, organizational slack and 
control variables were standardized across two-digit SIC code firms to eliminate industry specific 
effects (McGrath & Nerkar, 2004; O’Brien, 2003). 
 
Analysis 
The hypotheses were tested in step-wise regressions incorporating standardized interaction terms where 
one set of regressions analyzed risk management effects against performance and another set of 
regressions analyzed the antecedents to effective risk management (Aiken & West, 1991; Kleinbaum et 
al., 1998). A number of robustness checks were carried out to test the sensitivity of results to 
alternatives variable measures, different data trimming techniques, sample splits, and potential 
endogeneity problems that might cause biased parameter estimates. Hence, we also applied two-stage 
least square (2SLS) regressions to determine ERM variables as predictors in the performance 
equations, which is considered appropriate when the independent variables may be correlated with the 
error terms of the dependent variable (Theil, 1971).   
 
RESULTS 
Descriptive statistics and correlation coefficients on key variables are reported in Table 1.  
 
----- Please insert Table 1 about here ----- 
 
 
The initial results from the step-wise multiple regression analyses are presented in Table 2 
below where the regression coefficients against return on assets and Tobin’s q as dependent variables 
are reported for comparative purposes. It is apparent from these results that effective risk management 
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(ERM) has a significant positive relationship to the lagged performance measures of ROA after 
controlling for industry performance, company size, financial leverage and other influential factors. 
The same result prevails when Tobin’s q is used as performance measure even though the sample size 
is somewhat smaller due to missing observations. These results are consistent with hypothesis 1. 
Further analyses were conducted to test the robustness of results with different data trimming 
techniques applied. Hence, we first excluded observations with performance below and above the mean 
value plus and minus three times the standard deviation and subsequently windsorized the data around 
three times the standard deviation. This did not alter the results.  
We repeated the regressions using the alternative measure of ERM based on volatility of cash 
flow earnings (CFROI) but this did not change the findings. We conducted split-sample analysis based 
on data from the high growth decade 1991-2000 and the turbulent decade 2001-2010 with periodic 
recessions. Although there were some modifications in the regression coefficients the analytical results 
were not materially different from those reported in either of the two sub-periods. It should be noted 
that the number of observations is significantly reduced as more variables are included in the 
regressions due to lack of complete data coverage and this may call for more refined techniques to the 
analyses. Nonetheless, the general result remains robust in all the regressions. 
----- Please insert Table 2 about here ----- 
The regression coefficients on the interaction terms between ERM and the different slack 
variables show mixed results. Hence, the interaction between ERM and sales, general and 
administrative costs (the SGA ratio) has a significant positive relationship to return on assets and the 
interaction between ERM and liquidity reserves (the current ratio) has a significant positive 
relationship to Tobin’s q. While this is not a clear cut result, it seems to indicate that some recoverable 
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slack may support responsive initiatives and thereby enhance effective risk responses as well as some 
liquidity can help the execution of value creating business opportunities as part of the effective risk 
responses. The interaction between ERM and autonomous investment as an indicator of incremental 
leeway for responsive investment has significant positive relationships to both performance measures, 
which provides some support for hypothesis 2. 
The results from the second regression analyzing potential antecedents to effective risk 
management (ERM) are shown in Table 3. It should be noted that the number of observations is vastly 
reduced in these analyses due to incomplete data and because we apply the analysis to datasets across 
consecutive five-year periods. The results show that resources available in the form of allocated sales, 
general and administrative expenses (the SGA ratio) have a negative first order relationship to effective 
risk management (ERM) and that only capital reserves (the equity-debt ratio) have a direct positive 
relationship to ERM as proposed by the conventional risk management literature (Moelbroek, 2002). 
This provides weak support for hypothesis 3.  
----- Please insert Table 3 about here ----- 
The interaction terms between sales, general and administrative expenses (the SGA ratio) and 
capital reserves (the equity-debt ratio) has a significant positive relationship to ERM thus indicating 
that initial development of responsive initiatives can enhance risk management effectiveness if there is 
potential slack available to fund implementation. This reasoning is supported by a positive interaction 
effects between capital reserves and autonomous investment as an indicator of leeway to invest in 
business opportunities. These results lend some support for hypothesis 4.  
Finally, we see that while the first order direct effect of sales, general and administrative costs 
(the SGA ratio) is negative, the second order effect is significantly positive as a potential indicator that 
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sufficient recoverable slack may drive innovation and responsive initiatives to enhance effective risk 
responses. However, the second order effect of liquidity reserves (the current ratio) is significant and 
negative, which indicates a diminishing risk effect from excessive cash positions. There is no 
significant second order effect of capital reserves (the equity-debt ratio) but only a significant positive 
direct first order relationship to effective risk management. While these results may hint the potential 
contours of non-linear relationships between slack and effective risk management, there is no clear 
support for hypothesis 5.       
DISCUSSION & CONCLUSION 
The reported results based on analyses of a comprehensive updated dataset support the notion that 
an ability to dampen the impacts from exogenous risk events so the corporate cash flow and earnings 
volatility is reduced will be associated with higher performance outcomes. This study reports on effects 
related to a contemporary time period including the turbulent decade 2001-2010 that comprised two 
interim periods of economic recession and thus complements prior risk management studies. Based on 
a time-lagged effects analysis, the positive relationship between effective risk management (ERM) and 
the economic value creating potential of the firm is found to be robust against alternative performance 
and risk measures, different data trimming techniques and regression analytical approaches. More 
interestingly perhaps, the findings are also robust across two different economic sub-periods the high 
growth globalization decade 1991-2000 and the subsequent recession and crisis ridden decade 2001-
2010. Hence, we find consistency with risk management results reported on prior time periods (e.g., 
Andersen, 2008, 2009; Smithson & Simkin, 2005). 
Prior studies investigating the direct effects of adopting formal enterprise risk management 
approaches have so far been inconclusive (e.g., Beasley, Pagach & Warr, 2008). However, here we 
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report significant and robust relationships between effective risk management capabilities and 
economic returns in subsequent periods over a recent period of twenty years. That is, firms that 
responded effectively to exogenous risk events throughout this time period and thereby reduced the 
adverse downside effects were apparently able to extend their value creation potential. Yet, the analysis 
cannot say precisely what constituted the main drivers of the underlying strategic response capabilities. 
However, the study provides an initial search for important moderating influences from different forms 
of organizational slack on the effective risk management outcomes and reports on a preliminary 
investigation of related antecedents to effective risk management.  
While this search is inconclusive at this stage, we find strong hints that some availability of slack 
resources provide the basis for innovation and responsive initiatives and that these can be important for 
the ability to create business opportunities that enhance corporate maneuverability. Furthermore, 
maintaining a certain level of self-generated cash flow and potential financial slack seem to provide 
leeway to execute business opportunities when changing environmental conditions call for these kinds 
of adaptive business responses. However, more detailed analysis is still required to uncover explicitly 
how this underlying dynamic operates.  
These initial results seem to suggest that effective risk management capabilities relate to 
availability of sufficient resources to develop innovative opportunities that enable the firm to respond 
to changing conditions in the competitive environment. The findings uncover a potential tension 
between management control and corporate entrepreneurial perspectives where the availability of 
sufficient, although not excessive, slack resources is a prerequisite for effective risk management 
outcomes (Jensen, 1986, 1993). The incremental insights from this study suggest that these are not 
either or considerations. There is an urge for balanced solutions, which points to a need for more 
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refined analyses into the intriguing and important relationships between resource availability, corporate 
entrepreneurship, risk management, performance and corporate longevity. 
It is argued that risk reduction allows the firm to reduce expensive equity capital needed to 
support operating risk exposures and where effective risk management is seen as a substitute for capital 
reserves (e.g., Nocco & Stulz, 2006). Hence, a major goal (and advantage) of risk management 
supposedly is that it can reduce waste and thereby save scarce capital resources and that this should be 
an important part of the job of a Corporate Risk Officer (CRO) and top management. Hence, a prior 
study found that the appointment of CROs is more likely in firms with high financial leverage and poor 
risk management outcomes (Liebenberg & Hoyt, 2003). Another study of CRO announcements found 
that a common antecedent includes volatile operating cash flows, high stock volatility, and CEOs with 
incentives based on stock options (Pagach & Warr, 2011). This may suggest that adoption of formal 
risk management practices often is driven by aggressive CEOs who (or possibly their boards) feel a 
need to contain potential excessive downside losses.   
However, as this study suggests reducing capital buffers can have potential adverse risk 
management effects. That is, if potential slack is reduced to a very low level it may reduce the 
organization’s ability to take autonomous initiatives and respond effectively to new risk events. The 
conventional risk management view is one-sided and inflexible with the aim to avoid downside risk 
and reduce resource waste. However, the key to enable effective responses to uncertain strategic risks 
is the availability of slack that induces learning from local responses and builds it into viable business 
opportunities in the changing business environment.  
This means that firms need to take initial probing risks to create opportunities needed for 
strategic renewal and effective responses to unexpected and unpredictable competitive developments. 
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So effective risk management is the process where individual decision makers assume calculated risk 
within areas of expertise and deep business insights in order to develop effective responses to future 
challenges (e.g., Culp, 2001).  Hence, risk management in practice is not really conceived to reduce all 
risks but rather to assume the necessary risks that enable opportunistic responses to emerge (e.g., 
Adams, 1995). Hence, some slack must be invested in innovative efforts to create new strategic options 
and the availability of financial slack makes it possible to execute these strategic options when the 
competitive conditions change.        
In short, effective risk management does seem to have a significant positive relationship to 
organizational performance outcomes and corporate value creation and this result appears to be robust 
against alternative measures, data refinements, and time periods. Corporate risk management 
capabilities can be enhanced by availability of different types of slack resources in the form of 
recoverable, available and potential slack as well as self-generating financial means. Slack resources 
can provide leverage for responsive initiatives and engage in needed development activities that 
provide strategic choices under environmental uncertainty. However, the limited data availability in the 
updated datasets calls for more refined studies to uncover the details of the dynamic risk management 
process that lies underneath.  
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Table 1.     Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
      Mean    S.D.          1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8             
 
 1  Return on assets     0.027     0.241     -    -    -    -    -    -    -    -     
      
 2  Tobin’s q      1.821     2.078   0.426**    -    -    -    -    -    -    -    
 
 3  Effective risk management    4.153     7.816   0.178*    0.094    -    -    -    -    -     -       
 
 4  Organizational size     7.744     5.481   0.199*  0.239**   0.082    -    -    -    -     -       
 
 5  Capital reserves     0.350     0.476   0.020  0.085   0.080  0.038    -    -    -     -      
 
 6  Liquidity reserves     1.563     1.642  -0.036  0.139+  -0.088  0.007  0.024    -    -     -     
 
 7  Sales, general & adm.     0.046   0.437   0.067  0.086   0.044  0.008  0.333**  0.072    -     -      
    
 8  Investment intensity     0.096     0.544   0.008  0.162*  -0.052  0.006   0.006 -0.059 -0.050     -    
 
 9  Autonomous investment    0.567     0.859    0.112+  0.035   0.012  0.056  0.200**  0.285** -0.056 -0.070      
   
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
+ p < 0.10;    * p < 0.05;  ** p < 0.01;   
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Table 2.     Regression Analyses – Performance effects of Effective Risk Management [Regression Coefficients (t-values)] 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Dependent variable:                                 Return on assets                            Tobin’s q     
 
Number of observations     32,313       6,067     6,067    21,095     4,658     4,658 
  
Number of groups        3,378          897        897      2,625        737        737 
 
 
Intercept          -.044***         .045*       .047*       .521***     3.955***     3.915***  
        (-4.37)      (2.25)    (2.32)    (3.55)    (18.43)   (18.24) 
 
Effective risk management (ERM)        .009***         .009***       .008***       .051***        .088***       .082*** 
      (16.39)       (6.01)    (5.36)     (7.02)     (6.33)    (5.73) 
 
Industry performance          .923***        .984***        .981***       .875***       .896***       .892*** 
      (34.65)   (23.11)   (23.09)        (31.73)   (17.22)   (17.14) 
 
Organizational size (ln[sales])         .007***       -.004      -.004      -.054*       -.328***       -.322*** 
        (4.78)    (-1.40)   (-1.36)   (-2.56)  (-10.56) (-10.36) 
 
Sales, general and adm. (SGA ratio)         -        -.065***       -.064***          -        -.344***       -.339*** 
           (-22.63)  (-22.25)    (-12.61) (-12.33) 
 
Liquidity reserves (Current ratio)         -         .014***         .013***           -  .        .018        .019 
           (6.87)     (6.54)        (1.02)     (1.11) 
 
Capital reserves (Equity-debt ratio)        .035***       .033***        .032***       .139***        .106***       .116*** 
      (22.81)  (16.42)     (2.05)        (10.45)      (5.41)     (5.72) 
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Investment intensity (Cap. exp./assets)        -      -.001        .001        -         .150***       .156*** 
          (- .49)      ( .67)        (8.32)   (8.56) 
 
Autonomous inv. (Cash flow/cap.exp.)         -        .006***       .010***       -         .095***       .106*** 
          (3.33)     (4.45)        (5.39)   (4.93) 
 
ERM*Sales, general & adm. costs         -         -         .006***       -           -       -.009 
             (4.08)         (- .61) 
 
ERM*Liquidity reserves          -         -       -.003       -           -        .035* 
           (-1.05)          (2.51) 
 
ERM*Capital reserves          -         -       -.001       -           -        .012 
             (- .67)          ( .76) 
 
ERM*Autonomous investment         -         -        .006**       -           -        .042** 
            (3.15)          (2.49) 
   
 
 
R-squared within           .154       .231       .235          .159          .146      .149    
 
R-squared between          .167     .130       .135      .134         .012         .009 
 
R-squared overall          .171     .130       .135      .139         .000         .000 
 
 
F-significance           .000        .000       .000      .000           .000      .000 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
+ p < 0.10;    * p < 0.05;  ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001 
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Table 3.     Regression Analyses – Risk Management Antecedents [Regression Coefficients (t-values)] 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Dependent variable:                             Effective Risk Management (ERM)    
 
Number of observations        4,112       3,203 
  
 
Number of groups            694          576 
 
 
Intercept           -.641**       -1.858*** 
  
         (-2.52)      (-5.62)   
 
Organizational size (ln[sales])          .008*         .025*** 
         (2.39)        (5.63)  
 
Sales, general and adm. (SGA ratio)        -.443***          -.352*** 
         (-7.69)       (-4.71) 
 
Liquidity reserves (Current ratio)          .020                    .101 
           (0.43)          (1.57) 
 
Capital reserves (Equity-debt ratio)         .205***            .162*** 
          (5.01)             (3.22)  
 
Investment intensity (Cap. exp./assets)          -         -.059 
               (1.06) 
 
Autonomous inv. (Cash flow/cap.exp.)           -          .216*** 
               (3.18) 
 
SGA ratio* SGA ratio           .131***                 .125***   
         (4.54)            (3.73)   
 
Liquidity reserves* Liquidity reserves        -.042**          -.058*** 
        (-2.90)            (-3.59)  
- 1 - 
 
 
Capital reserves* Capital reserves        .011           .001 
        (0.60)         ( .03) 
 
Liquidity reserves* SGA ratio           -         -.020 
              (- .35) 
 
Capital reserves* Liquidity reserves          -                 .006 
              (1.46) 
 
SGA ratio* Capital reserves           -                .035* 
              (2.51) 
 
Investment intensity*Autonomous inv.         .0006                 .019 
           (1.50)       ( .38) 
 
Capital reserves*Autonomous inv.          .064+                .121*** 
           (1.64)      (2.74) 
    
 
 
R-squared within             .032             .041     
 
R-squared between            .044         .059 
 
R-squared overall            .029         .034  
 
F-significance             .000            .000     
__________________________________________________________________________________________ 
+ p < 0.10;    * p < 0.05;  ** p < 0.01;  *** p < 0.001 
 
